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CASE DIGEST
This Case Digest provides brief analyses of cases that represent
current aspects of transnational law. The Digest includes cases
that apply established legal principles to new and different factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories, and
references are given for further research.
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1.

ALIENS' RIGHTS

ALIEN IS INELIGIBLE FOR NATURALIZATION WHEN HE IS RELIEVED
FROM MILITARY SERVICE AND WAIVES ALL RIGHTS UNDER IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION LAWS

Upon receiving an induction notice in 1967, petitioner, a native
of Argentina and a permanent resident of the United States since
1956, invoked a United States-Argentina treaty that rendered
him exempt from United States military service. Petitioner understood that by invoking the treaty he would, pursuant to section 315 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, forfeit any
opportunity to become a United States citizen. In 1974 petitioner
filed a petition for naturalization. On the basis of section 315 the
naturalization examiner recommended denial. Petitioner argued
before the district court that although his induction had been
halted in 1967, he had not received an alienage exemption classification until 1972, and thus the Government had failed to meet its
obligation under the statute to formally classify him. Petitioner
further argued that his written acknowledgement was not an informed waiver of rights since he was not advised that seeking the
exemption would bar his re-entry into the United States with immigrant status. Reasoning that the Government's obligation
under the statute was fulfilled by allowing petitioner to avoid immigrant induction, the district court denied the naturalization petition. The court also concluded that petitioner had made a know-
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ing and intelligent waiver of rights and that it was not necessary
for the Government to advise petitioner of all of the consequences
under the Immigration and Naturalization Act that might flow
from his waiver. Significance-This decision makes it clear that
the obligation of the Government under section 315 is fulfilled by
refraining from any attempt to enlist the alien and that administrative reclassification is not a determinative criterion for validating an alien's waiver of rights. In re Petition of Javkin, 500 F.
Supp. 711 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
EXECUTIVE ORDERS REQUIRING UNITED STATES CLAIMS AGAINST

IRANIAN ASSETS To BE SUBMITTED TO BINDING ARBITRATION

ARE

VALID EXERCISE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

As part of the agreement to obtain the release of the hostages,
the United States and Iran agreed to use a binding arbitration
tribunal to settle the claims of United States nationals against
Iranian entities. A later executive order suspended all claims
pending in any United States court, and permitted them to be
presented in that tribunal. A creditor of an Iranian entity, relying
on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and article II of the United States Constitution as authority, brought suit
in district court to have the executive orders purporting to suspend lawsuits against Iranians declared unlawful and to have the
previously authorized attachments nullified. The court held that
the executive orders are within the authority vested by IEEPA,
which explicitly authorizes the President to compel the transfer
of any property in which any foreign country or national has any
interest; to nullify, void or prohibit any acquisition or holding of
any property in which any foreign country or national has any
interest; and to void the exercise of any right with respect to any
property in which any foreign country or national has any interest. The court held that IEEPA was -consistent with the broad
presidential powers to handle extraordinary foreign affairs situations and that the Congress never intended the passage of IEEPA
to cripple the President's negotiating power. Significance-This
is the first decision to determine the validity of the hostage agreement and the accompanying executive orders. Chas T. Main International,Inc., v. United States, 49 U.S.L.W. 2599 (D.C. Mass.
Mar. 17, 1981).
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INJURY OR INTENT TO INJURE IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE

CRIME OF ASSAULT ON A FOREIGN OFFICIAL OR AN INTERNATIONALLY
PROTECTED PERSON

Defendants threw paint on the United States and Soviet Union
Ambassadors to the United Nations. They were convicted of assault on an internationally protected person and a foreign official
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 112(a). Although section 112(a) does
not specifically refer to injury or intent to injure, it proscribes
violent attacks or attempts to do violence to such persons, and
imposes punishment of three years imprisonment, a $5,000 fine,

or both. Included in a section 112(a) violation are the elements of
a violation under 18 U.S.C. 112(b), which proscribes threats, intimidation, abusive language, and harrassment aimed at foreign
officials and is punishable by six months imprisonment, a $500
fine, or both. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that proof of injury or intent to injure is not an essential element of a conviction under section 112(a). A section 112(a) violation and a section 112(b) violation are thus distinguished on the
basis of whether the act is violent. Significance-Regardless of
Whether injury is intended or actually occurs, this decision allows
the courts to impose the more severe section 112(a) penalty when
a person is violent toward a foreign official or an internationally
protected person. United States v. Gan, 636 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.
1980).
2. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
COMMUNITY LAW AUTHORIZES A MEMBER STATE OF THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY TO PRESCRIBE PENALTIES FOR A CONTRAVENTION OF THE PROHIBITION AGAINST FISHING WITHOUT AUTHORIZA-

TION IN ITS FISHERY LIMITS.

The attorney general of Ireland sued the master of a fisheries
vessel registered in Spain for violating Irish fisheries legislation
by having nets with undersized mesh on board and by fishing
within the exclusive fisheries limits of Ireland. The attorney general alleged that the master committed those acts on July 10,

1978, while his vessel was positioned twenty nautical miles off the
baseline, whereas pursuant to Council Regulation No. 1376178 of
June 21, 1978, Ireland had previously extended its fishery limits
to 200 nautical miles from the baseline. The accused responded
that the London Fisheries Convention of 1964, to which Spain
and Ireland are parties and which addresses twelve mile limits,
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created antecedent rights for him that are preserved by article
234 of the Treaty of Rome (Treaty). The Circuit Court for the
County of Cork, Ireland referred to the Court of Justice of the
European Communities for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of article 234 and the regime applicable to the fishery limits of Ireland. That court ruled that article 234 provides that the
Treaty's provisions shall not affect the rights and obligations arising from agreements between Economic Community member
states and non-member states that were concluded before the
Treaty entered into force. Since Ireland did not join the Community until after the London Fisheries Convention, this would
seemingly mean that the 1964 provisions would still be binding.
Article 234 is, however, without prejudice to the member state's
obligation to take all appropriate steps to eliminate incompatibilities between such an agreement and the Treaty. Also, since Council Regulation No. 1376178 prohibited Spanish-registered vessels
from fishing without authorization in Community member states'
fishery limits, but provided no penalties for contravention of this
prohibition, it is consistent with Community law for Irish authorities to take all appropriate measures to ensure its implementation. Significance-This decision is the first attempt to carefully
delineate and restrict the otherwise broad applicability of article
234 of the Treaty of Rome when Community rules which take
account of the general development of international law in the
field of fishing on the high seas are superimposed on a regime
which previously applied in exclusive fishing zones. Attorney
General v. Burgoa, Case No. 812/79 (Dur. Ct. Jus., Oct. 14, 1980).
3.

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE

EXECUTIvE BRANCH ASSERTIONS OF NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY IN FOREIGN POLICY WILL NOT AUTOMATICALLY LIMIT A COURT'S ASSERTION
OF JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE PROPERTY CLAIMS

Plaintiff, a United States corporation, sued defendant, the
State of Iran, to recover alleged contractual debts and to attach
Iranian assets that were frozen pursuant to Executive Order No.
12170. Pending before the court were defendant's motion to dismiss on grounds of lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficiency of service, and a motion to
quash filed by several United States government agencies. The
United States Government filed a suggestion of interest requesting that the district court stay the instant pending proceedings
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for an indefinite period. The Government argued that certain regulations of the Treasury Department prohibited the court from
further consideration of the case and, alternatively, that the court
should exercise its equitable powers to stay the proceedings due
to the potential foreign policy ramifications of the court's decision. District Judge Greene rejected the alternative contention.
According to the court, the Treasury regulations in question had
been interpreted as vehicles to channel the anticipated flood of
litigation and not as prohibitions against court action. The court
acknowledged that the Treasury regulations did limit transfers of
frozen assets and indicated that any pending decisions would be
evaluated in light of the regulations. In rejecting the Government's foreign policy argument, Judge Greene balanced the Government's interests in the unhampered conduct of foreign policy
against citizens' rights to seek redress for property claims.
Though the Government claimed that court proceedings might
restrict the President's flexibility either in using the Iranian assets as a bargaining lever or in responding to Iran's sovereign immunity defense, the court found these assertions too vague to justify an indefinite stay of the proceedings. The court did, however,
grant a stay of seventy days since the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia had granted a ninety day stay in a similar
case. Significance-This decision indicates the reluctance of the
courts to accept executive assertions of foreign policy interests as
limitations on the jurisdiction of the courts or as barriers to citizens' property claims. National Airmotive Corp. v. Iran, 499 F.
Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1980).

